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MOURA

v.

STATE BAR.

[18 C. (2d)

THE COURT.-The recommendation of The State Bar
that the petitioner be disbarred is challenged by him in this
proceeding to review its action. He contends that the penalty imposed upon him is too severe, considering the offense
which he committed.
There is no dispute concerning the facts. The petitioner
raised the check of a client from $6 to $6,000, cashed it and
appropriated the money. He later pleaded guilty ~o a·charge
of forgery. Upon a showing that he had made full restitution of ,the' money, the court suspended the imposition of
sentence and placed him on probation for a period of five
years upon condition, among others, that he refrain from the
practice of law during that time.
Followin.g' the disposition of the criminal charge, The State
-Bar instituted disciplinary proceedings against him. Upon
hearing' the evidence, a local administrative committee
adopted findings, which were approved by the Board of Governors, that he should be disbarred. The petitioner contends
that because he was granted probation in the criminal case,
the penalty in the disciplinary proceeding should be only
a suspension of. his license to practice law for the period of
probation. The fact that he was placed on probation, says
the petitioner, "should be entitled to great weight and controlling importance" ..
[1] Ordinarily, the findings of a local administrative committee which have been. approved by the Board of Governors
will be followed by this court, although it is not boun~.
thereby. [2] In the present case the facts fully justify thi}
recommendation which has been made. A member of thtl,
bar who appropriated $6,000 of his client's money by (L'J"tg'.
ing a ~heck certainly does not have the" good moral dJ(a.r
acter" which is required of an attorney at law by the &t.lJf;uteL
of this state (Bus. & Prof. Code, sec. 6062), and he la(~k'iJ all
',appreciation:of the principles of common honesty.NJ.oreover, his past conduct should be considered in cOlliLl'eetion
with the present charges against him. (Kennedy v. State
Bar, 13.oa1. (2d) 236 [88 Pac. (2d) 920].) The fs)et that
in 1937, disciplinary proceedings were instituted agairJ.!3t the
petitio:ner and he was privately reproved indicates that he
.has not"fp.lfill,~d his professional obligations in the }J<uA;" The
penalty imposed upon an attorney at law for p;(.fdu;r;ional
v
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misconduct is not only to punish the individual but to protect the public, the legal profession and the court (Marsh v.
State Bar, 2 Cal. (2d) 75 [39 Pac. (2d) 403]), and the petitioner's abuse of his right to practice an honorable profession necessitates his removal from it.
lt is ordered that the petitioner be disbarred and that his
name be stricken from the roll of attorneys at law of this
state.
PetitIoner's application for a rehearing was denied May 26,
1941.

[L. A. No. 16558. In Bank.-April 29, 1941.]

IMPERIAL ICE COMPANY (a Corporation), Appellant, v.
WAYNE ROSSlER et aI., Respondents.
[1] Interference-With Contract Relations-lndticing Breach by
Unlawful Means.-An action will lie for inducing· a breach of
contract by a resort to means in themselves unlawful, such as
libel, slander, fraud, physical violence, or threats of such action.
[2] ld.-With Contract Relations-Competition as Justification.
A person is not justified in inducing a breach of contract
simply because he is in competition with one of the parties
to the contract, and seeks to further' his own economic advantage at the expense of the other.
[3] ld.-With Contract Relations-Right of Action.-An action
will lie for unjustifiably inducing a breach of contract. (Contrary statements in Boyson v. Thorn, 98 Cal. 578, 33 Pac. 492,
21 L. R. A. 233, disapproved.)
[4] ld.-With Contract Relations--Complaint.-A cause of action
is stated in a complaint for· injunctive relief which alleges
that defendants intentionally and actively induced a party to'
violate his contract with the plaintiff so that they could sell
ice to him, that the contract gave the plaintiff the right to
sell ice in the stated territory free from competition of the
contracting party, that the defendants, by virtue of their in1. Liability for procuring breach of contract, note, 84 A. L. R.
43. See, also, 14 Cal. Jur. 695; 30 Am. Jur. 70.
McK .. Dig. References: 1-4. Interference, § L
1.8 C. (2d)-2 .
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terest in the sale of ice in such territory, were in effect competing with the plaintiff, and that by inducing the violation
of the contract they sought to further their own economic
advantage at plaintiff's expense.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Fred Miller, Judge pro tem. Reversed.
Action to enjoin violation by one defendant of a contract
not to engage in business in competition with a purchaser,
and to restrain other defendants from inducing a breach of the
contract. Judgment for the latter on sustaining a demurrer
to the complaint without leave to amend, reversed.
Earl E. Moss and Everett A. Hart for Appellant.
M. Tellefson for Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-The California Consumers Company purchased from S. L. Coker an ice distributing business, inclusive of good will, located in territory comprising the city of
Santa Monica and the former city of Sawtelle.· In the purchase agreement Coker contracted as follows: "I do further
agree in consideration of said purchase and in connection
therewith, that I will not engage in the business of selling
and or distributing ice, either directly or indirectly, in the
above described territory so long as the purchasers, or anyone
deriving title to the good will of said business from said purchasers, shall be engaged in a like business therein." Plaintiff, the Imperial Ice Company, acquired from the successor
in interest of the California Consumers Company full title to
this ice distributing business, including the right to enforce
the covenant not to compete. Coker subsequently began selling in the same territory, in violation of the contract, ice supplied to him by a company owned by W. Rossier, J. A. Matheson, and Fred Matheson. Plaintiff thereupon brought this
action· in the superior court for an· injunction to restrain
Coker from violating the contract and to restrain Rossier and
the Mathesons from inducing Coker to violate the contract.
The complaint alleges that Rossier and the Mathesons induced Coker to violate his contract so that they might sell
ice to him at a profit. The trial court sustained without leave
to amend a demurrer· to the complaint of the defendants
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Rossier and Mathesons and gave judgment for those defendants. Plaintiff has appealed from the judgment on. the sole
ground that the complaint stated a cause of action against
the defendants Rossfer and the Mathesons for inducing the
breach of contract.
The question thus presented to this court is under what
circumstan'ces mayan action be maintained against a defendant who has induced a third party to violate a contract with
the plaintiff.
[1] It is universally recognized that an action will lie for
inducing breach of contract by a resort to means in themselves unlawful such as libel, slander, fraud, physical violence, or threats of such action. (See cases cited in 24 Cal.
L. Rev. 208; 84 A. L. R. 67.) Most jurisdictions also hold
that an action will lie for inducing a breach of contract by
the use of moral, social, or economic pressures, in themselves
lawful, unless there is sufficient justification for such inducement. (See cases cited in 84 A. L. R. 55; 24 Cal. L. Rev.
208, 209; see Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 Harv.
L. Rev. 663, 671; Carpenter, Interference With Contractual
Relations, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 728, 732; Rest., Torts, gec. 766.)
Such justification exists when a person induces a breach
of contract to protect an interest that has greater social
value than insuring the stability of the contract. (Rest.,
Torts, sec. 767.) Thus, a person is justified in inducing the
breach of a contract the enforcement of which would be injurious to health, safety, or good morals. (Brimelow v. Oasson, (1924) 1 Ch. 302; Legris v. Marcotte, 129 Ill. App. 67;
Rest., Torts, sec. 767 (d).) The interest of labor in im_]
proving working co.nditions is of sufficient social importance .
to justify peaceful labor tactics otherwise lawful, though
they have the effect of inducing breaches of contracts· between employer and employee or employer and customer.
(Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, 156 Cal. 70 [103 Pac. 324];
Parkinson 00. v. Butlding Trades Oouncil, 154 Cal. 581 [98
Pac. 1027, 16 Ann. Cas. 1165, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 550]; McKay Y. Retail Automob~1e Salesmen's Local Union No. 1067,
16 Cal. (2d)· 311 [106 Pac. (2d) 373] ; Kemp Y. Division No ..
241, 255 Ill. 213 [99 N. E. 389, Ann. Cas: 1913D, 347] ;
Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572 [78 N. E. 753, 116 Am. St.
Rep. 272, 7 Ann. Cas. 638, 6 L. R.A. (N. S.) 1067]; Grant
Oonst. Oo.v. St. Paul BuilcUng Trades Oouncil, 136 Minn.
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167 [161 N. W. 520, 1055] ; National Protective Assn. v. Cum"
ming, 170 N. Y. 315 [63 N. E. 369, 88 Am. St. Rep. 648, 58
L. R. A. 135] ; Roddy v. United Mine Workers of America,
41 Okl. 621 [139 Pac. 126, L. R. A. 1915D, 789]; J ettonDekle-Dumber Co. v. Mather, 53 Fla. 969 [43 So. 590] ; Clemmitt v. Watson, 14 Ind. App. 38 [42 N. E. 367]; Gray v.
Building Trades Council, 91 Minn. 171 [97 N. W. 663, 103
Am. St. Rep. 477, 1 Ann. Cas. 172, 63 L. R.A. 753] ; State
v. Employers of Labor, 102 Neb. 768 [169 N. W. 717, 170
N. W. 185] ; see Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. K 88 [60 Sup.
Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed. 1093] ; Carlson v. California, 310 U. S.
106 [60 Sup. Ct. 746, 84 L. Ed. 1104]; Rest., Torts, secs.
797 to 812.) In numerous other situations justification exists
(see Rest., Torts, secs. 766 to 774) depending upon the importance of the interest protected. The presence or absence
of ill-will, sometimes referred to as "malice", is immaterial,
except as it indicates whether or not an .interest is actually
being protected. (Boyson v. Thorn, 98 Cal. 578 [33 Pac. 492,
2i L. R. A.233] ; Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Council,
supra j see cases cited in 84 A. L. R. 50; see Rest., Torts,
sec. 766, comment M.)
[2] It is well established, however, that a person is not
justified in inducing a breach of contract simply because he
il) in competition with one of the parties to the contract and
seeks to further his own economic advantage at the expense
of the other. (See cases cited in 84 A. L. R. 83; 24 Cal.
L. Rev. 208, 211; see Rest., Torts, sec. 768 (2).) Whatever
interest society has in encouraging free and open competition
by means not in themselves unlawful, contractual stability is
generally accepted as of greater importance than competitive
freedom. Competitive freedom, however, is of sufficient importance to justify one competitor in inducing a third party
to forsake another competitor if no contractual relationship
exists between the latter two. (Katz v. Kapper, 7 Cal. App.
(2d) 1 [44 Pac. (2d) 1060] ; Union Labor Hospital Assn. v.
"Vance Redwood Lbr. Co., 158 Cal. 551 [112 Pac. 886, 33
L. R. A. (N. S.) 1034] ; D~bnam v. Simonson, 124 Md. 354 [92
Atl. 782] ; Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555; Rest., Torts, sec.
768 (1).) A person is likewise free to carryon his business,
including reduction 'of prices, advertising, and solicitation in
the usual lawful manner although some third party may be induced thereby to breach his contract with a competitor in favor
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of dealing with the advertiser. (Philadelphia Dairy Products
v. Quaker City Ice Cream Co., 306 Pa. i64 [159 Atl. 3, 84
A. L. R. 466J ; Citizens' Light etc. 'Co. v. Montgomery Light
etc. Co., 171 Fed. 553; Passaic Print Works v. Ely &- Walker
Dry Goods Co., 105 Fed. 163 [44 C. C. A. 426, 62 L. R. A.
673].) Again, if two parties have separate contracts with a
third, each may resort to any legitimate means at his disposal to secure performance of his contract even though the
necessary result' will be to cause a breach of the other contract. (Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v. De Witt, 120 Md.
381 [87 Atl. 927, Ann. Cas. 1915A', 702] ; affirmed 237 U. S.
447 [35 Sup. Ct. 636, 59 L. Ed. 1042]; Knapp v. Penfield,
143 Misc. 132 [256 N. Y. Supp. 4~] ; National Life &- Acc,~,
Ins. Co. v. Wallace, 162 Okl. 174 [21 Pac. (2d) 492]; Diver
v. 1I1iller, 4 W. W. Harr~ [34 Del.] 207, 208 [148 Atl. 291] ;
Tidal Western Oil Co. v. Shackelford, (Tex. Civ. App.) 297
S. W. 279; 84 A. L. R. 63; Rest., Torts, sec. 773.).A party
may not, however, under the guise of competition actively
and affirmatively induce the breach of a competitor '8 contract in order to secure an economic advantage over that
competitor. The act of inducing the breach m.ust be an intentional one. If the actor had no knowledge of the existence of the contract or his actions were not intended to induce
a breach, he cannot be held liable though an actual breach
results from his lawful and proper acts. (Rest., Torts,
sec. 766, comment e; Hornstein v. Podwitz, 254 N. Y. 443
[173 N. E. 674] ; Sorenson v. Chev1'olet Motor 00., 171 Minn.
260 [214 N. W. 754] ; Kerr v. Du Pree, 35 Ga. App. 122 [132
S. E. 393] ; New York Trust Co. v. Island Oil &- Transport
Corp., 34 Fed. (2d) 649; Wissmath Packing Co. v. Mississippi River Power Co., 179 Iowa 1309 [162 N. W. 846] ; see
Robins Dry Dock &- Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U. S. 303 [48
Sup. Ct. 134, 72 L. Ed. 290]; see additional cases cited in
84 A. L. R. 49.)
[3] In California the case of Boyson v. Thorn, supra, has
been considered by many as establishing the proposition that
no action will lie in this state for inducing breach of contract by means which are not otherwise unlawful. In that
case the manager of a hotel induced the owner of the
hotel to evict plaintiffs in violation of a contract. The complaint expressly alleged the existence of malicious motives
on the part of the manager. This court affirmed a judg-
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ment entered on, an order which sustained a demurrer without leave to amend, stating that an act otherwise lawful
was not rendered unlawful by the existence of "malice". It is clear that the confidential r<;}lationship that
existed between the manager of the hotel and the owner
justified the manager in advising the 'owner to violate his
contract with plaintiffs. His conduct thus being justified,
it was' lawful despite the existence of ill-will or malice on
his part. The statements to the effect that no interference
with contractual relations is actionable if the means employed are otherwise lawful were not necessary to the decision and should be disregarded. This interpretation is substantiated by the construction placed upon Boyson v. Thorn
in the case of Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Coundl,
supra, wherein it is stated: "In the first named case [Boyson
v. Thorn] it was concluded upon an extensive review of the
authorities, American and English, that 'an act which does
not amount to a legal injury cannot be actionable becallse it
is done with bad intent" '. In Oalifornia Grape Oontrol
Board v. California Produce Corp., 4 Cal. App. (2d) 242 [40
Pac. (2d) 846], the District Court of Appeal held that an
unjustifiable interference with contractual relations was actionable and issued an injunction restraining continued interference, which is a proper remedy in cases of this type" (see
cases cited in 84 A. L. R. 85), despite defendant's reliance
on Boyson v. Thorn. (Appellant's Reply Brief, p. 7,- 1st
Div., 2d Dist., Civ. No. 9615.) This case marks an outright
adoption of the majority view. The case of Katz v. Kapper,
supra, relied upon by defendants, held only that a person by
the use of lawful means could, interfere with advantageous
business relationships of a competitor by inducing customers
to trade with him instead. The case did not involve a breach
of contract, and the court specifically stated: "In deciding
whether the conduct of defendants, alleged in the complaint,
is actionable, it is necessary to apply certain well-settled rules
relating to competition in business. These may be generally
stated as follows: 'Competition in business, though carried
to the extent of ruining a rival, is not ordinarily actionable,
but every trader is left to conduct his business in his own
way, so long as the methods he employs do not involve wrongful conduct such as fraud, misrepresentation, intimidation,
coercion, obstruction, or molestation of the rival ()£ his ser-
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vants or workmen, or the procurement of the violation of
contractual .relations ... '." (Italics added.) In California, therefore, an action will lie for unjustifiably inducing a
breach of contract.

[4] The complaint in ,the present case alleges that defendants actively induced Coker to violate his contract withplailltiffs so that they might sell ice to him. The contract gave to
plaintiff the right to sell ice ill the stated territory free from
the competition of Coker. The defendants, by virtue of their
interest in the sale of ice in that territory, were in effect competing with plaintiff. By inducing Coker to violate his contract, as alleged in the complaint, they sought to further their
Own economic advantage at plaintiff's expense. Such conduct is not justified. 'Had defendants merely sold ice to-Coker without actively inducing him to violate his contract,
his distribution of the ice in the forbidden territory in violation qf his contract would not then have rendered defendants liable. They may carryon their business of selling, ice
as usual without incurring liability for breaches of contract
by their customers. It is necessary to prove that they intentionally and actively induced the breach. Since the ,complaint alleges that they did so and asks for an injunction on
the grounds that damages would be inadequate, it states a
cause of action, and the demurrer should therefore have been
overruled.
The judgment is reversed.
Edmonds, J., Shenk, J., and Gibson, C. J., concurred.
Curtis, J., concurred in the judgment.

